Saving the Peremptory Challenege: The Case for a Narrow Interpretation of McCollum by Zalesne, Deborah & Zalesne, Kinney
Denver Law Review 
Volume 70 
Issue 2 Colloquy - Racism in the Wake of the 
Los Angeles Riots 
Article 12 
January 2021 
Saving the Peremptory Challenege: The Case for a Narrow 
Interpretation of McCollum 
Deborah Zalesne 
Kinney Zalesne 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Deborah Zalesne & Kinney Zalesne, Saving the Peremptory Challenege: The Case for a Narrow 
Interpretation of McCollum, 70 Denv. U. L. Rev. 313 (1993). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
SAVING THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE: THE CASE
FOR A NARROW INTERPRETATION OF MCCOLLUM
DEBORAH ZALESNE* AND KINNEY ZALESNE**
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky,' peremp-
tory challenges have received a flurry of scholarly attention. 2 This re-
sponse is understandable. Peremptory challenges, a method by which
litigants strike jurors from the jury venire for any reason or for no rea-
son at all, 3 were used for centuries without restriction in the Anglo-
American criminal justice system. 4 In Batson, however, the Court held
that the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause 5 could limit the
prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges. Thus, two seemingly
mutually exclusive concepts were merged. Peremptory challenges,
designed to give unfettered expression to parties' subjective impres-
sions, were now reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause, which
required the parties to exercise those challenges in a non-discriminatory
way. This marriage spawned a persistent conflict.
Since Batson, scholars and judges have struggled to reconcile the
rationality of equal protection with the subjectivity of peremptory chal-
lenges. Emphasizing litigants' use of race in their exercise of the per-
emptory challenge, commentators have argued over whether and how
parties might retain their privilege to exercise peremptory challenges, in
light of the race-neutral principles of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court's current balance, which preserves peremptory chal-
* J.D., 1992, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., 1988, Williams College.
** J.D., 1991, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1987, Yale University. Law Clerk, The
Honorable J. William Ditter, Jr., Senior Judge, District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
The authors thank Kevin Downey, Judge J. William Ditter, Jr., Cynthia Farina, Steven
Bihbak and Karen McDonnell for their assistance.
1. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review ofJury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989); RaymondJ. Broder-
ick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 369 (1992); Douglas
L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use
of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1990); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race
Discrimination injury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725 (1992).
3. A peremptory challenge is defined as:
[t]he right to challenge a juror without assigning, or being required to assign, a
reason for the challenge. In most jurisdictions, each party to an action, both civil
and criminal, has a specified number of such challenges and after using all his
peremptory challenges he is required to furnish a reason for subsequent
challenges.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 136 (6th ed. 1990). The use of a peremptory challenge to ex-
clude a juror is often called "striking" a juror.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 43-63.
5. The Equal Protection Clause provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
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lenges but regulates them to eliminate the most extreme violations of
equal protection, is well-struck. The Court's latest peremptory chal-
lenge decision, however, Georgia v. McCollum,6 which subjects a criminal
defendant's exercise of the peremptory challenge to Equal Protection
review, may be susceptible to overbroad interpretation. Although the
holding of the case technically applies only to situations where white
criminal defendants strike black jurors, the decision might be read as
applying to the obverse situation, where black criminal defendants chal-
lenge white jurors. We believe such a reading of McCollum would be
unwise.
This Article analyzes the historical, doctrinal and philosophical rea-
sons for preserving but regulating the peremptory challenge, and argues
for a narrow reading of McCollum. Part I traces the history and develop-
ment of peremptory challenges in the Anglo-American jury system,
pointing out the advantages peremptory challenges were intended to
give both criminal defendants and the justice system generally. Our sur-
vey of the history of peremptory challenges shows that many of the orig-
inal justifications for the peremptory challenge still apply.
Part II examines the major Supreme Court cases on peremptory
challenges since 1965, presenting the spectrum of solutions proposed
by Supreme Court Justices for resolving the tension between equal pro-
tection values and the subjective peremptory challenge. A majority of
the Court endorses a compromise regulating the use of peremptory
challenges. To justify and extend this solution, the Court has shifted its
focus from the equal protection rights of criminal defendants to the
equal protection rights of potential jurors. This change in focus reflects
a philosophical shift from liberalism, which emphasizes the rights of the
opposing parties, to communitarianism, which focuses on the public in-
terest and extends beyond any parties' immediate dispute. Since the
Court's emerging priority has been to legitimate the criminal justice sys-
tem in the eyes of the community, legitimation, rather than mechanical
application of the rules adopted in Batson and its progeny, should gov-
ern the Court's decisions in future cases.
In part III we urge a narrow interpretation of McCollum. This argu-
ment is based on the three principal concerns expressed in these
Supreme Court cases: preserving the peremptory challenge, securing
equal protection and promoting community respect for and compliance
with the criminal justice system. In the near future, courts may be called
upon to decide whether the rules announced in the Supreme Court's
post-Batson line of cases apply in the situation where white jurors are the
subject of the peremptory challenge. An extension of the jurors' rights
expressed in McCollum to excluded white jurors would undermine these
principal concerns. If every peremptory challenge with a racial compo-
nent is subject to equal protection review, the peremptory challenge will
lose its power. This might well lead to the abolition of peremptory chal-
lenges, undermining the purposes the peremptory challenge has tradi-
6. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
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tionally served. Extension of equal protection rights to white jurors is
also doctrinally unnecessary. As long as challenges of black jurors cre-
ate all-white juries, but challenges of white jurors do not create the re-
verse, the exclusion of white jurors will not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.
Finally, the Court's philosophical shift from liberalism to communi-
tarianism, evidenced by its increasing concern for public perception of
court justice, also calls for a narrow reading of McCollum: if black de-
fendants are unable to strike white jurors they "know in their hearts" to
be racist, their regard for the system, arguably more precarious than that
of whites, will only diminish.
I. THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
A. Origins and Development of the Peremptory Challenge in England
Peremptory challenges originated early in the life of the jury system
in England. 7 Historians have not precisely identified the extent to which
7. Commentators and courts, in discussing the peremptory challenge, generally fo-
cus on its treatment by later commentators rather than on its actual origins. See, e.g., Hol-
land v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 481-82(1990) (relying on nineteenth century commentator);
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-14 (1965)(relying on commentators' analyses from
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); Broderick, supra note 2, at 371-74 (analyzing
development of prosecutorial right to peremptory challenge beginning in the fourteenth
century rather than on actual origins of the peremptory challenge).
The ancient English system administered law through the "popular courts," relying
on the parties themselves to bring forward knowledgeable witnesses and to resolve dis-
putes without input from community members. See James B. Thayer, The Jury and Its Devel-
opment, 5 HARV. L. REV. 249, 251 (1892). The practice of trying cases by jury replaced the
"popular courts." The history ofjuries, amply detailed elsewhere, is beyond the scope of
this article. See, e.g., 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 614-31 (2d ed. 1911) (discussing origins and
development of the jury system).
The Crown gradually began to rely on an inquisition system wherein jurors, knowl-
edgeable about the events that were the subject matter of dispute, were selected by the
Crown. See id. at 250-54 (detailing the rise of trial by inquisition as the forerunner of the
modem jury system). In the criminal system, these jurors functioned in a manner akin to
today's grand jury. See Charles L. Wells, Early Opposition to Petty Juries in Criminal Cases, 30
LAw Q. REV. 97, 102 (1914). They accused defendants of crimes, and then, through a
variety of measures that changed over time, the royal courts decided the truth of the inqui-
sition's accusation. The methods for determining whether an accusation made by the in-
quisition in a criminal case was true were primitive by today's standards. Primarily, there
were two methods. The first, trial by battle, involved an actual physical battle between
litigants to determine who was being truthful. The second, trial by ordeal, required a
criminal defendant to suffer a series of ordeals, such as submission to heated irons, to
determine the truth of his story. See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR
UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 3 (1977). Henry II moved to insti-
tutionalize this evolving practice of bringing criminal suits by inquisition in the Assize of
Clarendon in 1166, which mandated that:
inquiry shall be made in every county in every hundred by the twelve most lawful
men of the hundred and by the four most lawful men of the vill, upon oath that
they shall speak the truth, whether in their hundred or vill there be any man who
is accused or believed to be a robber, murderer, thief, or a receiver of robbers,
murderers, or thieves since the King's accession.
Reprinted in THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 112-13
(1956). Henry had begun the process of institutionalizing the inquisition system. The
Constitution of Clarendon in 1164 created jury trials in certain cases and provided: "The
sheriff shall cause 12 legal men of the neighborhood, or of the fill, to take an oath in the
1993]
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defendants enjoyed a right to peremptory challenge during the twelfth
and early thirteenth centuries, although most state that criminal defend-
ants enjoyed such a right "at common law." 8 Rather than serving as a
device to protect criminal defendants, however, the challenge appears to
have originated as a mechanism for the Crown to maintain control over
the jury. Because the early juries served the Crown's purposes - by
indicting and subjecting to ordeal those individuals who violated Eng-
land's laws - the Crown wished to ensure that its jury members would
be sympathetic to the Crown's interests. 9 Hence, the Crown gave itself
the right to challenge an unlimited number of potential jurors peremp-
torily. 10 Jurors whom the Crown perceived as uncooperative would be
promptly removed. The Crown also accorded criminal defendants the
right to challenge jurors peremptorily in capital cases, although the ra-
tionale for doing so at that time is not clear from the historical record."
The structure of and rationalizations for the jury continued to
evolve throughout the fourteenth century. The primary development of
this period was that the jury changed from serving merely as accuser to
serving as the mechanism for determining whether the Crown's accusa-
tions were true. Initially, members of the accusing jury served on the
fact finding jury as well, but by the 1340's the two functions had clearly
separated. 12 Hence, the jury increasingly became the body which de-
cided whether a defendant had actually committed a crime; its legitimacy
derived in part from its role as the arbiter of truth and falsity.
13
As the jury became more impartial and less a tool of the Crown,
Parliament grew increasingly uncomfortable with the Crown's right to
challenge jurors peremptorily without limit. Fearing that the practice of
peremptory challenge made verdicts appear engineered by the Crown,
in 1305 Parliament eliminated the Crown's right to challenge jurors pe-
remptorily. 14 It preserved, however, the right of the criminal defendant
presence of the bishop that they will declare the truth about [the case]." See LLOYD E.
MOORE, THE JURY, TOOL OF KINGS, PALADIUM OF LIBERTY 35-36 (1973).
Throughout the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, the jury continued to serve an
accusatorial function rather than acting as the arbiter of the truth. MOORE, supra, at 35-36;
see also Wells, infra note 12, at 102.
8. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 7, at 55 ("At common law ... the defendant was per-
mitted to challenge 35 jurors."); CHARLES W. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 155
(1962).
9. See VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 147.
10. Id.
11. Id. Numerous commentators have stated that criminal defendants enjoyed the
right to challenge thirty-five jurors peremptorily in criminal cases, a number that is sup-
ported by the fact that Parliament later granted criminal defendants in capital the right to
thirty-five challenges. See MOORE, supra note 7, at 55; See also SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, 1
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 325-26 (1903).
12. See Charles L. Wells, The Origin of the Petty Jury, 27 LAw Q. REV. 347, 351 (1911).
13. This development was certainly not complete in the fourteenth century, as the
jury still was largely bound to follow the instructions of the Court in reaching its judgment.
Nevertheless, the process that would ultimately separate the grand and petit jury (and the
court and the jury) were set in motion in the fourteenth century. See MOORE, supra note 7,
at 49-63.
14. An Ordinance for Inquests, 33 Edw. 1 Stat. 4 (1305) provided:
He that challenges a Jury or Juror for the King shall shew his cause .... [B]ut if
they that sue for the King will challenge any of those Jurors, they shall assign of
[Vol. 70:2
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to do so.
Although the jury continued to develop in its role as neutral
factfinder,15 the English courts' treatment of the peremptory challenge
remained for centuries as Parliament had fashioned it in 1305. Only
criminal defendants could challenge without cause, although the
number of such challenges afforded to defendants decreased over the
years. 16 Thus, as the jury system underwent numerous changes from
the fourteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the criminal defendant
retained the right to the peremptory challenge.
B. Historical Reasons for the Survival of the Peremptory Challenge in England
The retention of the peremptory challenge throughout these devel-
opments appears, at first, anomalous. After all, the practice originated
as a device for allowing the Crown to control the makeup of the jury.
Why then did the English system preserve the right of defendants to
challenge jurors long after the Crown had lost its right? Apparently the
defendant's right survived because English courts and commentators ra-
tionalized the practice subsequently and infused it with new meaning.
Two general rationales developed for preserving the criminal defend-
ant's right to strike jurors without cause.
First, commentators recognized the Crown's inherent advantages in
criminal proceedings and saw the peremptory challenge as a way to
equalize the defendant's position. Most notable among the Crown's ad-
vantages was that its agents still controlled the selection of the larger
panel from which a petit jury was chosen.' 7 Therefore, as a matter of
their Challenge a Cause Certain, and the truth of same Challenge shall be en-
quired of according to the Custom of the Court ....
15. Not until the late seventeenth century were juries generally free to arrive at ver-
dicts without instruction from or outright coercion by the courts. See MOORE, supra note 7,
at 67-89.
The single most important development in the establishment of the jury as a neutral
factfinder was the decision of the appeals judges of the Court of Common Pleas in Bushell's
Case (1670), V State Trials 999 (T.B. Howell, ed. 1810), where the court considered the
habeas petition of jurors who had been imprisoned for finding defendants not guilty de-
spite the insistence of the trying magistrate that the defendants were guilty. After being
imprisoned, the jurors filed a habeas petition, which the Court of Common Pleas granted
because, it reasoned, the purpose of the jury was to evaluate the evidence itself and reach
its own conclusion. See VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 5.
16. Parliament initially provided defendants with the right to challenge thirty-five ju-
rors peremptorily. See MOORE, supra note 7, at 67-89. The number was decreased to
twenty by 1530, and eventually to three in modem times. SeeJames Gobert, The Peremptory
Challenge - An Obituary, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 528, 529. In 1988, Parliament abolished the
criminal defendant's right to peremptory challenge. See id. Some commentators have
made much of Parliament's ultimate decision to abolish peremptories completely. See, e.g.,
Broderick, supra note 2, at 372-73. The claims of these commentators that the peremptory
challenge is merely a historical anomaly are overstated, however, for they fail to account
for the challenge's survival through a host of changes in English legal system for more
than seven centuries. Rather than treating the peremptory challenge as anomalous, the
better approach is to understand why the challenge survived for such a long period and
what purposes its users believed it served.
17. See Holdsworth, supra note 11, at 325 ("In spite of the statute of 1351-52 the
crown still retained means of influencing the petty jury which it only gradually relin-
quished. The jury was selected by [the Crown's] officers").
1993]
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fairness, English courts thought it proper to allow defendants to elimi-
nate at least some of the members of the Crown-selected panel without
explanation.' 8 In an oft-quoted but seldom analyzed comment, Black-
stone opined that allowance of the peremptory challenge for defendants
was "a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners for
which our English laws are justly famous."' 19
Blackstone was referring, at least in part, to the English system's
effort to conduct proceedings that appeared fair. Since the Crown's selec-
tion of the larger jury panel might make the trial appear hopelessly bi-
ased, and certain to end in conviction, the defendant's right to eliminate
jurors whom he suspected of bias helped assuage public concerns.
Hence the English system encouraged the general impression that its
trials were fair, and that they merited community trust.
The second rationale for preserving the defendant's peremptory
challenge was that a jury verdict appeared more legitimate and worthy
of respect if both sides had implicitly consented to it.20 If the criminal
defendant could not strike jurors without cause, he would undoubtedly
confront a jury comprised of some individuals whom he felt were biased
against him.2 1 Allowing the defendant to strike potential jurors without
cause became a mechanism for ensuring that the process of trial by jury
appeared fair, so that both litigants and the observing community would
accept jury verdicts more readily.
By the time the peremptory challenge was adopted as a privilege of
criminal defendants in America, therefore, it had already been justified
on grounds quite different from its original roots. Nevertheless, it had
become an important part of the jury system, both because it enhanced
the truth-seeking character of trials and because it legitimated the jury
system in the eyes of both the litigants and the community.
C. The Peremptory Challenge in America
The American colonies retained the defendant's right to perempto-
rily challenge jurors as part of the inherited common law, 2 2 and after
independence, Congress codified the defendant's right to challenge ju-
18. See id. at 324.
19. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, * 353 (1859).
20. Id. ("[A] prisoner (when put to defend his life) should have a good opinion of his
jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him, the law wills not that he should be
tried by any one man against whom he has conceived a prejudice, even without being able
to assign a reason for such his dislike.").
21. See Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REV.
545, 552 (1975) (noting that, in many cases, defendants want to strike jurors that they feel
are biased against them but against whom they cannot demonstrate cause to strike). Black-
stone noted that the voir dire itself might bias a juror against a criminal defendant
[U]pon challenges for cause shown, if the reasons assigned prove insufficient to
set aside the juror, perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes
provoke a resentment; to prevent all ill consequences from which, the prisoner is
still at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set him aside.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at * 353.
22. See VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 148.
[Vol. 70:2
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rors peremptorily in federal court. 23 During the nineteenth century,
American prosecutors also acquired the right to exercise such chal-
lenges, and by the beginning of the twentieth century, the prosecution's
right to challenge peremptorily was well established.
24
Two aspects of the use of the peremptory challenge in America
merit special mention. First, for much of the twentieth century, the use
of the peremptory challenge, particularly by the prosecution, served to
manifest racial discrimination and irrational prejudice rather than to bal-
ance the scales between the state and the accused. Literature detailing
the use of the peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner
is legion.2 5 Because the number of potential black jurors on any partic-
ular venire was generally small, the prosecution typically had enough
peremptory challenges to strike all the eligible blacks from the jury.2 6
Thus, with its peremptory challenges, the state could often guarantee an
all-white jury, which it believed was more favorable to the prosecution
than one which was racially-mixed. In cases involving black criminal de-
fendants, the peremptory challenge thus became an instrument of the
very evil it was designed to protect against: the state could engineer the
selection of a jury which was, on balance, thought to favor the state.
Second, although the use of the peremptory challenge was com-
monplace, the Supreme Court held that criminal defendants did not
have a constitutional right to exercise the peremptory challenge.
2 7
Hence, the doctrinal rationale for the peremptory challenge in the crimi-
nal system was precarious. Nevertheless, the peremptory challenge, as a
matter of history and philosophy, was well entrenched. The practice not
only survived in the Anglo-American system of justice for more than
seven centuries, but it continued to serve a legitimating function in the
criminal justice system by sustaining the appearance that both the prose-
cution and defense accepted a given jury as fair and impartial.
Ultimately, abuse of the peremptory challenge to exclude black ju-
rors led to the questioning of the philosophical premises that justified its
existence. In recent years, courts and commentators have tried to find
new doctrinal and philosophical explanations for preserving, abolishing
or regulating the use of the peremptory challenge.
23. See 1 Stats. 119, ch. 9 (1790).
24. See VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 150 (tracing the development of the prosecutorial
right to peremptory challenge in various American jurisdictions throughout the nine-
teenth century).
25. See, e.g., Frederick L. Brown et al., The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in
Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REV. 192, 206-09 (1978); Toni M.
Massaro, Peremptories or Peers? - Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures,
64 N.C.L. REV. 501, 509 (1986).
26. See Colbert, supra note 2, at 88-93.
27. See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) ("There is nothing in the
Constitution of the United States which requires the Congress to grant peremptory chal-
lenges to defendants in criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that is secured.").
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II. MODERN APPROACHES TO PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
A. Supreme Court Case Law Since 1965
The Supreme Court first considered the application of the Equal
Protection Clause to peremptory challenges in Swain v. Alabama.2 8 In
Swain, a black defendant was accused and subsequently convicted of rap-
ing a white woman. Following voir dire, the prosecution used its per-
emptory challenges to strike all six eligible black venire members.
29
Swain argued that this violated his right to equal protection of the laws.
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Swain had failed to prove
the prosecution struck those venire members solely on the basis of race.
The Court held that in order to demonstrate an equal protection viola-
tion based on the state's racially discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges, a petitioner must show that the prosecutor systematically used
race discrimination over a significant period of time.5 0 Because Swain
had, at best, merely demonstrated that such racially motivated chal-
lenges occurred in his case, he had not demonstrated an equal protec-
tion violation. Although the Swain Court technically applied the Equal
Protection Clause to peremptory challenges, the evidentiary require-
ment for demonstrating an equal protection violation was so high that
Swain effectively precluded equal protection challenges to peremptory
challenges.
Despite much criticism,3 1 Swain's framework for evaluating equal
protection claims in a peremptory challenge context remained the law
for twenty years. In 1986, however, the Supreme Court overruled
Swain. In Batson v. Kentucky 3 2 , a black defendant challenged the prosecu-
tion's use of its peremptory challenges to strike all the potential black
jurors as violative of equal protection principles. The Court agreed,
holding that purposeful race discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause could be established in a particular case provided that
the defendant demonstrate that: 1) he is a member of a cognizable ra-
cial group; 2) the prosecutor struck venire members of that group; and
3) the facts or other circumstances in the case raise an inference of the
prosecutor's intent to exclude those members on the basis of race.
3 3
28. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
29. Id. at 205.
30. The Court reasoned:
Unlike the selection process, which is wholly in the hands of state officers, defense
counsel participate in the peremptory challenge system, and indeed generally
have a far greater role than any officers of the State. It is for this reason that a
showing that Negroes have not served during a specified period of time does not,
absent a sufficient showing of the prosecutor's participation, give rise to the infer-
ence of systematic discrimination on the part of the State .... [T]he defendant
must, to pose the issue, show the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory chal-
lenges against Negroes over a period of time.
Id. at 227.
31. See, e.g., Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of
the All-WhiteJury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966); Constitutional Law, The Supreme Court, 1964
Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 135 (1965); Comment, FairJury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J.
322 (1965).
32. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
33. Id.
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Upon the defense meeting these requirements, the burden shifts to the
state to come forward with a race-neutral explanation for its exercise of
the peremptory challenge. 34 The Court's decision made clear that it was
equal protection, and not concerns about a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment rights to a fair trial and impartial jury, that required regulation and
limitation of the state's right to peremptory challenges.
3 5
Batson, however, left unanswered the question of how far the Equal
Protection Clause extended its prohibition of racially discriminatory
peremptory challenges. In Powers v. Ohio,36 the Court began to define
the extent of the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition of racially biased
peremptory challenges. In Powers, a white criminal defendant objected
to the prosecution's exclusion of black jurors from the venire. Powers
did not claim that his own Sixth Amendment rights had been infringed
by the peremptory challenges, but rather that the Equal Protection
rights of the excluded jurors had been violated.3 7 Powers further ar-
gued that he had third-party standing to assert the juror's rights. 38 The
Court agreed and held that under Batson, a white defendant can object
to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude non-white
jurors. The Court interpreted Batson as finding an equal protection vio-
lation of both the excluded jurors' rights and those of the criminal de-
fendant. Therefore, the Court concluded that regardless of the race of
the criminal defendant, racially motivated peremptory challenges violate
the Equal Protection Clause. The Court reasoned that, in addition to
the harm to the defendant, racially discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenges also harm the excluded jurors and society. 39 Powers thus opened
34. Id. at 95.
35. Nevertheless, the Court soon confronted a challenge to the prosecution's exercise
of peremptory challenges rooted in the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment pro-
vides in relevant part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 1.
In Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990), a white criminal defendant challenged the
state's exclusion of the only two black jurors from the venire as violative of the Sixth
Amendment's mandate that he be tried by an impartial jury representing a fair cross-sec-
tion of the community. The Court held that while the Equal Protection clause forbids the
use of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, the Sixth Amendment
does not prohibit the state from using peremptory challenges in any manner that it sees fit.
This includes a racially discriminatory use. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia reasoned
that the Sixth Amendment guarantees an impartial jury, not a representative one. The
Supreme Court's decision foreclosed any chance of grounding constitutional challenges to
racially discriminatory peremptory challenges in the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 480. The
Court did hold, however, that under the Sixth Amendment a white defendant has standing
to object to the exclusion of black jurors. Id.
36. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
37. Id. at 1366-67.
38. Id. at 1370.
39. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy reasoned:
In Batson, we spoke of the harm caused when a defendant is tried by a tribunal
from which members of his own race have been excluded. But we did not limit
our discussion in Batson to that one aspect of the harm caused by the violation....
Batson recognized that a prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges harms the excluded jurors and the community at large.
111 S. Ct. at 1368 (citation omitted).
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the door to application of the Equal Protection Clause based on the
identity of the excluded jurors rather than solely on the identity of the
defendant.
The Court extended the rule prohibiting racially-biased peremptory
challenges to both plaintiffs and defendants in civil cases in Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co. ,40 largely relying on its analysis in Powers. In a final
extension of Powers, in Georgia v. McColIum41 the Court held that a white
criminal defendant's use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors
on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause. In both Ed-
monson and Powers, the Court emphasized that the equal protection rights
of the jurors could be asserted by the litigants, and that it was the depri-
vation of those jurors' rights which was the basis for regulating peremp-
tory challenges.
Throughout each of these cases, distinct voices have emerged pro-
posing how to reconcile the seemingly arbitrary and capricious 4 2 per-
emptory challenge with the rational demands of equal protection.
These different voices articulate divergent doctrinal and philosophical
theories in dealing with the peremptory challenge.
B. Solutions to the Peremptory Challenge - Equal Protection Conflict
1. Justice Marshall and the Argument for Elimination of
Peremptory Challenges
The opinions in Batson set forth the range of possible solutions to
the peremptory challenge-equal protection dichotomy. On one end of
the spectrum is Justice Marshall, who concurred in the judgment in Bat-
son, but argued that the majority did not go far enough towards ensuring
the vindication of equal protection values. He claimed that peremptory
challenges must be abolished altogether.43 Merely permitting judicial
scrutiny of prosecutors' peremptory challenges does not, according to
Justice Marshall, end the racial discrimination which peremptory chal-
lenges inject into the jury-selection process.4 4 Therefore, in order to
redeem the "right of the defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity
with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment,"'4 5 the prosecu-
tion's peremptory challenge right should be abolished altogether.4 6
Justice Marshall concluded that because "between [the defendant] and
the state the scales are to be evenly held,"'4 7 the right of defendants to
exercise peremptory challenges must be abolished as well.
4 8
40. 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991).
41. 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992).
42. See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892).
43. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 107 (citation omitted).
46. Id 102-03.
47. Id. at 107 (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).
48. Of course, such formal equality had not been required for the five centuries or so
between 1305 and the 1800's, when prosecutors re-acquired the right to exercise peremp-
tory challenges in this country. See supra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
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2. Chief Justice Burger and the Argument for Unfettered
Peremptory Challenges
At the other end of the spectrum, Chief Justice Burger, dissenting
in Batson, argued that peremptory challenges should be preserved with
all their prejudices, racial and otherwise, intact. 4 9 Chief Justice Burger
emphasized that prosecutors often use peremptory challenges not to ex-
ploit prejudice but to eliminate it. He asserted that the peremptory
challenge carefully permits "the covert expression of what we dare not
say but know is true more often than not."'50 The dissent further em-
phasized the inapplicability of equal protection doctrine to the peremp-
tory challenge because of the inherently unaccountable nature of the
peremptory challenge.
5 1
Justice Thomas, concurring in McColIum, 5 2 would later echo Justice
Burger's reluctance to apply equal protection doctrine to peremptory
challenges. Justice Thomas argued that the early equal protection cases
were premised on the recognition that racism plagues juries and that the
racial composition ofjuries can affect case results. 53 He stated that be-
cause racial composition continues to makes a difference in ajury's deci-
sion, some defendants exercise race-based peremptory challenges solely
to counterbalance jurors' covert but pernicious biases. 54 Subjecting de-
fendants' peremptory challenges to the Court's review, he argued, with
the lofty goal of eliminating racism from the courtroom, may actually
deprive defendants of their only tool to strike racist jurors from the jury
panels. 5 5 In any event, Justice Thomas argued, as Chief Justice Burger
had, that the advantages of subjective, unexplained peremptory chal-
lenges to the defendant outweigh "the community's" nebulous interest
in aspirational statements from the Court about racial equality.
5 6
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Marshall, at opposite ends of the
spectrum agreed that the Court's solution of regulating the peremptory
49. Batson, 476 U.S. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 121 (quoting Babcock, supra note 21, at 553-54).
51. ChiefJustice Burger wrote:
[In making peremptory challenges, both the prosecutor and defense attorney
necessarily act on only limited information or hunch. The process cannot be in-
dicted on the sole basis that such decisions are made on the basis of "assump-
tion" or "intuitive judgment." As a result, unadulterated equal protection
analysis is simply inapplicable to peremptory challenges exercised in any particu-
lar case. A clause that requires a minimum "rationality" in government actions
has no application to "an arbitrary and capricious right."
Id. at 123 (citations omitted).
52. 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992) (Thomas, J, concurring).
53. Justice Thomas quoted Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), the first
case to hold that dejure exclusion of blacks from jury venires violated a black defendant's
right to equal protection:
It is well known that prejudices often exist against particular classes in the com-
munity, which sway the judgment ofjurors, and which, therefore, operate in some
cases to deny to persons of those classes the full enjoyment of the protection
which others enjoy.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360 (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309).
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challenge in light of the Equal Protection Clause would not solve the
problem. And, interestingly, both argued that their solutions would
strengthen the public's faith in the jury system - Justice Marshall's by
eliminating the irreparably racist practice of peremptory challenges, and
Chief Justice Burger's by preserving the one device designed to maxi-
mize public trust in jury verdicts. 57 The majority of the Court chose a
middle ground, however.
3. Justices Kennedy and Blackmun and A Regulatory
Compromise
The majority of the Batson Court adopted a regulatory compromise,
initially in the name of the criminal defendant. The Court's solution in
Batson, which rejected both Justice Marshall's and ChiefJustice Burger's
more extreme proposals, was to review the peremptory challenges of
prosecutors to eliminate the worst excesses of racial discrimination. Ini-
tially, this compromise was seen as a means of protecting the rights of
the criminal defendant. Only subsequently would the Court see the
compromise as a means of protecting the "public interest" or public
concern for the jury system.
a. Preserving Peremptory Challenges
The Court rejected Justice Marshall's proposal, to eliminate all per-
emptory challenges in the goal of racial equality, because of the perem-
tory's historical and actual benefits. Summarizing the Court's
cumulative respect for the peremptory challenge in Holland, Justice
Scalia stated that the peremptory challenge plays an important and nec-
essary role in ajury trial by striking out the partiality on both sides, thus
eliminating bias from the jury.58 Nevertheless, however, the Court has
reiterated that the peremptory challenge is not constitutionally guaran-
teed.59 Yet its resistance to the proposal to abolish all peremptory chal-
lenges survives, for many of the same reasons that have prompted
English-speaking courts to preserve peremptory challenges since the
fourteenth century. Peremptory challenges both make juries fairer and
give the appearance of making juries fairer. 60 Only abuse of peremptory
challenges subverts the intent to make juries more fair. As a result, the
Court concluded peremptory challenges need to be regulated. Total
elimination of peremptory challenges would leave open the risk of los-
ing their original advantages. Without any peremptory challenges, de-
57. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
58. Justice Scalia stated:
We have acknowledged that [the peremptory challenge] occupies "an important
position in our trial procedures," and has indeed been considered "a necessary
part of trial by jury." Peremptory challenges, by enabling each side to exclude
those jurors it believes will be most partial toward the other side, are a means of
"eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality on both sides," thereby "assuring the selec-
tion of a qualified and unbiased jury.
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990) (citations omitted).
59. Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 108 (Marshall, J., concurring); Frazier v. United States, 335
U.S. 497, 505 n.Il (1948); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
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fendants may well be judged by jurors they believe are biased against
them. 6 1 In addition, public knowledge that an individual litigant has the
right to strike a juror bolsters the public's confidence in the justice
system.
6 2
Finally, if the proposal that peremptory challenges be eliminated is
made in the name of racial equality, it must also be recognized that even
though elimination of peremptories may raise the number of minority
jurors, it may do so at the expense of minority defendants. Defendants
who suspect racism among potential jurors, but who cannot strike them
without cause, may suffer the effects of discrimination in a far more dev-
astating and final way than do jurors who are not allowed to serve on a
jury.
b. Securing Equal Protection
While insisting on preserving the peremptory challenge, the Court
since Batson has resisted with equal resolve proposals to retreat from its
equal protection rationale for regulating these challenges. Arguments
that equal protection analysis cannot be applied to peremptory chal-
lenges because of the inherently unaccountable nature of peremptory
challenges are flawed. For many years, before equal protection regula-
tion of peremptory challenges, prosecutors often rampantly abused the
peremptory challenge by exploiting and perpetuating racial stereotypes
and discrimination. 63 It is true that peremptory challenges are meant to
be unaccountable and subjective. On the other hand, they are not
meant to accommodate every hateful and prejudiced thought a litigant
may have. Thus, the Court had reasoned, regulation of peremptory
challenges is necessary to secure equal protection for everyone involved
with the trial.
c. The Majority's Solution
Finding a middle ground between the abolition of peremptory chal-
lenges and complete, laissez-faire indifference to their application, a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court in Batson accepted a regulatory solution.
This regulation is necessary to preserve the right of peremptory chal-
lenges, but to prevent that right from being exercised in a way which
violates the Equal Protection Clause. The Court has endorsed this solu-
tion in each subsequent peremptory challenge case, extending the reach
of restrictions-from the prosecution trying a black defendant in Batson,
a white defendant in Powers, to all civil litigants in Edmonson, to all crimi-
nal defendants in McCollum.
61. See VALERIE HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 72-73 (1986) ("Suppose that
you are involved in a legal case and you are convinced that a particular prospective juror is
biased against you, even though the judge doesn't share your insight. The option of elimi-
nating that person through a peremptory challenge may help you to accept the verdict as
reasonable even if it should not be in your favor.").
62. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992); see also BLACKSTONE, supra
note 19, at * 353.
63. See sources cited supra note 2.
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An important change took place in the Court's doctrinal analysis
from Batson to the most recent decision in McCollum. While in Batson the
Court alluded to concerns about public confidence in the judicial sys-
tem, the focus of its holding was entirely on the equal protection rights
of the defendant. Slowly, however, the Court began to focus not on the
parties' rights but on the equal protection rights of the jurors. This shift
in focus from parties to jurors, who sit as a proxy for the public gener-
ally, reflects a willingness by the Court to effectuate two goals: first, to
honor communitarian or "public interest" ideals even in criminal proce-
dure; and second, and even more striking, to honor these public interest
ideals to the detriment of a criminal defendant.
C. The Court's Underlying Doctrinal Shift
The Court's change in focus from criminal defendant to juror
evolved slowly. Both Swain and Batson based their holdings on the equal
protection rights of the defendant. In dicta, the Batson Court referred
to concerns about excluded jurors6 4 and cited the need to preserve pub-
lic confidence in the judicial system. 6 5 Its holding, however, empha-
sized that a defendant's equal protection right is denied when he is tried
by ajury from which all eligible members of his race have been purpose-
fully excluded.
66
The juror-centered approach did not reach full fruition until later
cases. Concurring in Holland, in which the Court to bolster the result in
Batson with the Sixth Amendment, Justice Kennedy cited Batson's "estab-
lished rule" - that "exclusion of ajuror on the basis of race, whether or
not by use of a peremptory challenge, is a violation of the juror's consti-
tutional rights."' 6 7 Subsequently, the Court reaffirmed and expanded
this interpretation of Batson. Writing for the majority in Powers the fol-
lowing year, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that a juror struck on a basis
of a discriminatory peremptory challenge suffered harm. As a result the
community was harmed as well. 68 The Court held that a juror has a
64. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). ("As long ago as Strauder, therefore,
the Court recognized that by denying a person participation in jury service on account of
his race, the State unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror." (citations
omitted)).
65. Id.
66. Even Justice Marshall, whose proposal to eliminate peremptory challenges took
into consideration the general, societal interest in racial equality, did not take the dispute
in Batson outside the rights of the parties. He wrote: "Justice Goldberg, dissenting in
Swain, emphasized that '[wiere it necessary to make an absolute choice between the right
of a defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with the requirements of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a
choice of the former.' I believe that this case presents just such a choice." 476 U.S. at 107
(Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 244 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., dissenting).
67. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 488 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)(citation
omitted).
68. Justice Kennedy wrote:
Batson was designed to serve multiple ends, only one of which was to protect
individual defendants from discrimination in the selection ofjurors. Batson rec-
ognized that a prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges harms
the excluded jurors and the community at large (internal citations omitted).
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right not to be excluded from juror service because of the juror's race.
As a result, a prosecutor cannot exclude a qualified juror solely because
of the juror's race.69
Justice Kennedy emphasized both the importance of civic contribu-
tions and the value ofjury participation, stating that allowing citizens to
participate in the justice system was a main reason for the jury system.
70
Quoting Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 7 1 he noted that by participating in a jury, a
juror can prevent abuse of the judicial system, 72 and that a juror can
influence judicial decisions and the direction of society. 7" He concluded
with the observation that jury service safeguarded the law's democratic
component by protecting the litigants' rights and insuring the public's
tolerance of the law. 74 Powers, therefore, fully focused the Court on the
rights of jurors rather than on the rights of defendants.
75
Thus, by the time the Court considered the issues raised in Edmon-
son, the majority of the Court was comfortable with Kennedy's assertion
that it was the jurors' equal protection rights that were at issue. Justice
Kennedy now moved those jurors to the core of his holding, stating that
racial bias was improper in the courtroom, "race-based exclusion vio-
lates the equal protection rights of the challenged jurors." 76 Edmonson
considered the rights of litigants to use race in peremptory challenges in
civil cases, which made the centrality ofjurors much easier to accept. In
Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1368 (1991) (citations omitted).
69. The Court stated:
We hold that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using the
State's peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased per-
sons from the petit jury solely by reason of their race, a practice that forecloses a
significant opportunity to participate in civic life. An individual juror does not
have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right
not to be excluded from one on account of race.
Id. at 1370.
70. Justice Kennedy wrote:
The opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the administration ofjus-
tice has long been recognized as one of the principal justifications for retaining
the jury system.
Id. at 1368 (citations omitted).
71. 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
72. Kennedy stated:
The jury system postulates a conscious duty of participation in the machinery of
justice.... One of its greatest benefits is in the security it gives the people that
they, as jurors actual or possible, being part of the judicial system of the country
can prevent its arbitrary use or abuse.
Powers, 111 S.Ct. at 1368 (quoting Balzac, 258 U.S. at 310).
73. Justice Kennedy wrote:
The institution of the jury raises the people itself, or at least a class of citizens, to
the bench of judicial authority and invests the people, or that class of citizens,
with the direction of society.
Id. (quoting 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 334-337 (Schocker, 1st ed. 1461)).
74. Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards the
rights of the parties and insures continued acceptance of the laws by all of the
people.
Id. at 1369 (citations omitted).
75. The Court's concern for minorities' participation in civic life echoes its reasoning
in Voting Rights Act cases. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Moreover,
it continues the trend of giving constitutional protection to practices which help involve
historically excluded groups in civic life.
76. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991).
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the civil context, the rights of non-parties have always been more readily
considered, 7 7 and the notion that litigants' rights must accommodate
jurors' rights is palatable, if not universally accepted. But in McCollum,
which subjected the criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges to review for violations of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
seemingly transferred the language of jurors' rights from the civil con-
text to the criminal. 78 In McCollum, the Court began its reasoning by
explaining that regardless of whether a defendant or prosecutor ex-
cluded a juror because of race, the juror was exposed to racial discrimi-
nation. 79 The Court further couched jurors' rights explicitly in the need
for public confidence in the judicial system. 80 The Court noted that this
was especially true in race-related cases.8 '
Thus the Court's focus underwent a complete transformation.
From the holding in Batson, that a black defendant's right to equal pro-
tection may be violated when all eligible black jurors are systematically
excluded, the Court has come to hold that the rights ofjurors - indeed,
the rights of the whole community - are violated when a juror is struck
on the basis of race.
The Court's shift in focus from defendant to jurors in its equal pro-
tection analysis prompted a caustic response from Justices who disap-
proved. Dissenting in Powers, which was the first case in which a majority
of the Court cited Batson as holding that a prosecutor's discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges harmed the excluded jurors and the com-
munity at large, Justice Scalia charged the majority with abandoning the
purposes of both Strauder and the Fourteenth Amendment.8 2 He argued
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to guarantee blacks pro-
tection of the laws equal to that of whites. The Court's new shift to
protect black jurors, Justice Scalia argued, gave white defendants the use
of a doctrine created to balance blacks' chances in a racist society. He
lamented the distortion of equal protection jurisprudence and predicted
the Court's "self-satisfying," supposed "blow against racism" 8 3 would
jeopardize peremptory challenges and equal protection analysis
77. See infra text accompanying notes 101-03.
78. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354-57 (1992).
79. Id. at 2353.
80. Citing Powers, Justice Blackmun wrote:
One of the goals of ourjury system is to impress upon the criminal defendant and
the community as a whole that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in
accordance with the law by persons who are fair.
Id. at 2353-54 (citations omitted).
81. The need for public confidence is especially high in cases involving race-re-
lated crimes. In such cases, emotions in the affected community will inevitably be
heated and volatile. Public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice sys-
tem is essential for preserving community peace in trials involving race-related
crimes.
Be it at the hands of the State or the defense, if a court allows jurors to be
excluded because of group bias, it is a willing participant in a scheme that could
only undermine the very foundation of our system ofjustice - our citizens' confi-
dence in it.
Id. at 2353-54 (citations omitted).
82. Powers v. Ohio, 11l S. Ct. 1364, 1374-75 (1991)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1382.
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altogether.84
Concurring in McCollum, Justice Thomas echoed Justice Scalia's
concern and called the Court's shift in emphasis from the criminal de-
fendant's rights to the rights of jurors "a serious misordering of our
priorities."18 5 Justice Thomas argued this shift elevated juror's rights at
the expense of the defendant's. 86 Nonetheless, a majority of Justices
have approved the shift in the focus of the equal protection analysis. As
Justices Scalia and Thomas suggested, however, the implications of "ex-
alt[ing] the right of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the criminal
defendant" 87 may signal significant changes in the law of criminal
procedure.
D. The Ideological Significance of the Shift
The Court's change in focus from the defendant's rights to the ju-
rors' reflects its willingness to import communitarian principles to the
law of criminal procedure, an area traditionally reserved for liberal or
individualist principles of law. 88 Scholars have traced the developments
of both liberalism and communitarianism from the earliest of the Con-
stitutional Framers' writings89 through recent Supreme Court deci-
sions. 90 For our purposes, however, we need only recognize the
trademark principles of liberalism and communitarianism (or republi-
canism 9 1), in order to place the Court's shift in equal protection analysis
in philosophical perspective.
84. In particular, Justice Scalia predicted the standing problems the Court's decision
was likely to create. "While [Batson] refers to 'the harm' that 'discriminatory jury selection'
inflicts upon 'the excluded juror,' that is not a clear recognition, even in dictum, that the
excluded juror has his own cause of action-any more than its accompanying reference to
the harm inflicted upon 'the entire community,' suggests that the entire community has a
cause of action." Id. at 1379 (citations omitted).
85. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2360 (1992)(Thomas, J., concurring).
86. Justice Thomas wrote:
In Strauder, we put the rights of defendants foremost. Today's decision, while
protecting jurors, leaves defendants with less means of protecting themselves.
Unless jurors actually admit prejudice during voir dire, defendants generally
must allow them to sit and run the risk that racial animus will affect the ver-
dict .... In effect, we have exalted the right of citizens to sit on juries over the
rights of the criminal defendant, even though it is the defendant, not the jurors,
who faces imprisonment or even death.
Id.
87. Id.
88. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); JOHN P. DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE,
SELF-INTEREST AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1980); JOHN GREVILLE AGARD
POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term:
Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986).
89. See Wood, supra note 88.
90. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Republican Civic Tradition: Law's Republic, 97 YALE
LJ. 1493 (1988) (arguing traditional civic republican theory supports protection of indi-
vidual rights, in context of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
91. We call the public-centered philosophy "communitarianism," which encompasses
several community-minded critiques of liberalism, including republicanism. For an excel-
lent discussion of the recurrence of communitarian critiques, see Michael Walzer, The Com-
munitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6 (1990).
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Professor Morton Horwitz has contrasted9 2 the two philosophies
concisely:
Liberalism has stood for a subjective theory of value, a concep-
tion of individual self-interest as the only legitimate animating
force in society, a night-watchman state, and denial of any con-
ception of an autonomous public interest independent of the
sum of individual interests. Republicanism has stood for the
primacy of politics and the relative independence of ideals of
the good life from economic forces. It has emphasized the
growth and development of human personality in active polit-
ical life. It has proceeded from some objective conception of
the public interest and conceived of a state that could legiti-
mately promote virtue.
93
Stated in these terms, the Supreme Court's shift regarding peremptory
challenges reflects a profound change in philosophical emphasis. The
change in emphasis from Batson, stressing the inviolable rights of the
criminal defendant, to Powers, stressing the jurors' interests in not being
excluded from a "significant opportunity to participate in civic life,"' 94 to
McCollum, which highlighted society's interest in not "undermin[ing] the
very foundation of our system of justice--our citizens' confidence in
it"95 reflects an emergence of communitarian priorities in the Court's
treatment of peremptory challenges.
The Court's initial emphasis in Swain and Batson on the criminal de-
fendant's rights reflects the liberalist tradition. In the liberal model of
criminal justice, the state battles the accused, each armed to fight fairly
in its own self-interest. The state may prosecute zealously so long as it
respects the bounds of the defendant's inviolable rights. 96 The Court,
as night-watchman, monitors the prosecution to be sure these bounds
are respected. The criminal trial, therefore, gives each party the oppor-
tunity to vigorously argue its self-interest, that "legitimate animating
force" 9 7 from which the truth of the criminal charges is determined. It
is this contest between interested parties, ostensibly made fairer by the
exercise of peremptory challenges, from which justice will result.
Communitarian priorities, however, emphasize what Horwitz calls
the public interest, which includes the needs of people affected indi-
rectly, although perhaps profoundly, by any particular case before the
court. The opinions in Powers, Edmonson and McCollum speak the lan-
guage of communitarianism. These majority opinions emphasize the
92. Liberalism and republicanism are widely thought to be at odds with each other.
However, for a suggestion that "liberal republicanism" comprises both, see Cass R. Sun-
stein, The Republican Civic Tradition: Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1567-
1571 (1988).
93. MortonJ. Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1825, 1832 (1987).
94. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991).
95. Georgia v. McCollum 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992).
96. The defendant's shields are guaranteed by the Constitution. They include the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. CONST. amend. IV; the right against
double jeopardy, U.S. CONST. amend. V; and the right to a "speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury," U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.
97. Horwitz, supra note 93, at 1832.
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"growth and development of [the excluded jurors'] human personality
in active political life," beginning from an "objective conception of the
public interest." 98 That interest includes, at least for Justice Blackmun
in McCollum, the promotion of racial harmony in communities which
have suffered racially-motivated crime. 9 9
The emergence of communitarian principles in the law of peremp-
tory challenges has uncertain significance. On the one hand, it reflects
those historical justification which valued the peremptory challenge con-
tributions to the public perception that jury trials were fair.10 0 On the
other hand, however, considerations of public confidence and the ap-
pearance of impartiality had never before been used to diminish, rather
than augment, the rights of criminal defendants. Whereas the defend-
ant's right to the peremptory challenge was preserved after the Crown
had lost that right, the defendant's right was preserved because it helped
sustain public faith injuries' determinations. McCollum, in contrast, rep-
resents a willingness to nurture public confidence at the expense of the
defendant. This use of communitarian principles is a new and dramatic
shift, indeed.
In one sense, the preference for "public interest" considerations at
all in criminal procedure is unusual. Several areas of civil law explicitly
take non-parties' interests into account. For example, tort law often ex-
pressly considers long-range, communal good in determining optimal
tort liability schemes. 1 1 Domestic relations law considers the interests
of children in divorce proceedings between parents. 102 More generally,
the provisions for third party practice, class actions, and intervention
provide for complex civil litigation in which many parties with an inter-
est in a dispute can be included.'
0 3
Moreover, the substance of criminal law also regards some "objec-
tive conception of the public interest." 0 4 Statutory prohibitions against
murder, rape and robbery reflect a societal desire to outlaw and prevent
these acts. But criminal procedure has been a traditionally liberal field of
law. Perhaps because its strictures are set out in relative detail in the Bill
of Rights, the law of criminal investigation and prosecution reflects the
individualist model of state versus accused. It might be said that in crim-
inal punishment, general (as opposed to specific) deterrence projects the
"public interest," or that punishment's retributive goals satisfy the need
for communal perception that justice is being served. But for the most
98. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2348.
99. Id. at 2354.
100. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
221 (1980) (discussing trend in tort law to minimize overall social costs by imposing liabil-
ity on the "cheaper cost-avoider").
102. For example, courts are said to have inherent power to protect children, which
allows them to shape domestic remedies regardless of the desires of the parties. See HOMER
H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 238 (1987) (col-
lecting cases).
103. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19-24.
104. Horwitz, supra note 93, at 1832.
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part, throughout investigation and trial, any person's interests which
might compromise the defendant's are given little consideration.
Therefore, the implications of the Court's willingness in McCollum
to consider the public interest at the expense of the criminal defendant
may be profound. On the one hand, it is unlikely that the Court will
move toward a communitarian jurisprudence at every level of criminal
prosecution. While the Court did apply communitarian principles to the
peremptory challenge, that practice, unlike the shields guaranteed by
the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, is not constitutionally guaran-
teed. 10 5 It is therefore more susceptible to manipulation or change
based on policy- or community-oriented considerations. On the other
hand, however, the Court's eager defense of jurors' rights at the ex-
pense of defendants' rights signals a vision into criminal jurisprudence
which may inadequately protect defendants. The crucial next step must
be to interpret McCollum very narrowly.
III. THE FUTURE OF THE BATSON LINE OF CASES
The Supreme Court has charted a course for regulating peremptory
challenges to protect the equal protection rights ofjurors. The question
remains, however, how to define the scope of these rights. Under the
Court's current holdings, the rights of black prospective jurors can be
asserted by black criminal defendants (Batson), white criminal defend-
ants (Powers), civil litigants (Edmonson) and criminal prosecutors (McCol-
lum). What remains to be decided, however, is whether, as Justice
Thomas predicted in his McCollum concurrence, the same result must
ensue when the criminal defendants are black (or members of other mi-
nority groups) and the challenged jurors are white. Must the rights of
minority jurors not to be challenged peremptorily on the basis of race,
as so far defined by the Supreme Court, extend equally to whites? 10 6 An
analysis of the doctrinal and ideological concerns surrounding peremp-
tory challenges leads to the conclusion that the rules of the post-Batson
line of cases should not apply when the challenged jurors are white.
A. Doctrinal Analysis
There are two potential doctrinal arguments that reason against ap-
plying the Batson line of cases to challenges of white jurors. First, as a
matter of basic equal protection doctrine, differential treatment of white
jurors is arguably subject to a lower level of scrutiny than differential
treatment of blacks, or members of other suspect classes. 10 7 If the ter-
minology of levels of scrutiny were applied in peremptory challenge
105. See supra note 27.
106. The Supreme Court has rigorously applied strict race neutrality in other equal
protection contexts. See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down
local ordinance designed to guarantee a certain percentage of work projects for minority-
owned businesses).
107. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1969) ("Because the core of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of meaningful and unjustified distinctions based
on race, racial classifications are 'constitutionally suspect, subject to the 'most rigid scru-
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cases, a party asserting the interests of white jurors not to be struck from
a jury on the basis of race would be required to prove that those jurors'
exclusion is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 108 Black
jurors, on the other hand, speaking through any of the above-named
parties, would only have to show that those jurors' exclusion is not nar-
rowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.
The terminology of levels of scrutiny has never been used in the
peremptory challenge cases, however, because "purposeful racial dis-
crimination," rather than racial classification, is involved in a prosecu-
tor's racially motivated use of peremptory challenges.' 0 9 The argument
that classification of whites is treated differently for equal protection
purposes is likely irrelevant, since the exclusion of white jurors could
still involve purposeful racial discrimination. Given that any purposeful
racial discrimination is presumptively prohibited by the Batson line of
cases, the question becomes whether a black defendant's striking of
white jurors constitutes "purposeful racial discrimination."
The second doctrinal reason for not applying McCollum in cases in-
volving white jurors involves the reality surrounding a black defendant's
challenge of white jurors, which strongly suggests that no such "pur-
poseful racial discrimination" is involved."10 In every significant per-
emptory challenge case that the Supreme Court has confronted to date,
all black members of the venire eligible to sit on the jury were struck.
White parties successfully sought all-white juries, believing that their
chances of acquittal (or conviction, in the case of the government)
before a jury of their racial peers were better.' I Therefore, the striking
of black jurors led to a jury of a particular racial composition.
Because blacks frequently constitute only a tiny percentage of the
venire, 112 black defendants striking white jurors often have a different
purpose in mind. Since they can seldom use peremptory challenges to
create juries made up entirely of their own race, black defendants may
strike white jurors in order to keep some representation of members of
their own race on the jury. They are trying to assure, rather than pre-
vent, racially mixed juries. The Supreme Court's equal protection rule,
designed to prevent exclusion of a certain race from a jury, does not also
bar the exclusion ofjurors whose race is not in danger of full exclusion.
In other words, while a black criminal defendant might strike a white
juror on the basis of race, as Justice Thomas hypothesized in McCollum,
tiny.' They 'bear a far heavier burden ofjustification' than other classifications." (citations
omitted)).
108. See id.
109. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
110. Indeed, as a practical matter, prosecutors arguing for a wooden application of
McCollum could often make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination when a black
defendant uses his peremptories to strike only white jurors (or, indeed, when any litigant
uses his peremptories to strike only white jurors). Such a broad application of the rule
would not advance the purposes of equal protection because the jury would likely retain a
high degree of white representation.
111. Obviously in Powers, the white defendant from whose jury the prosecutor had
struck all eligible blacks, fared poorly anyway.
112. See Colbert, supra note 2, at 88-93.
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the Batson line of cases would not require the review of those peremp-
tory challenges that McCollum describes. The Court's equal protection
doctrine forbids not all court-approved, race-conscious jury selection,
but only that race-conscious jury selection designed to perpetuate total exclu-
sion of one race.
McCollum held that a defense attorney's use of peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude all the black members of the venire violated those ju-
rors' equal protection rights.1 3  Given twenty peremptory
challenges,1 4 the attorney could remove all 18 blacks from the jury ve-
nire.1 1 5 But such would not be the case were the scenario reversed.
Consider ChiefJustice Burger's hypothetical scenario in his dissent
in Batson.'" 6 There he predicted the holding of McCollum (that once
prosecutors were denied race-based peremptory challenges, defendants
would be as well), and declared that peremptory challenges would
shortly disappear altogether. He predicted dire consequences for all
criminal defendants:
Assume an Asian defendant, on trial for the capital murder of a
white victim, asks prospective jury members, most of whom are
white, whether they harbor racial prejudice against Asians. The
basis for such a question is to flush out any "juror who believes
that [Asians] are violence-prone or morally inferior .... " As-
sume further that all white jurors deny harboring racial preju-
dice but that the defendant, on trial for his life, remains
unconvinced by these protestations. Instead, he continues to
harbor a hunch, an "assumption," or "intuitive judgment," that
these white jurors will be prejudiced against him, presumably
based in part on race.'
1 7
Chief Justice Burger postulated that the Asian defendant would not be
able to strike these white, prejudiced jurors, and a racially biased verdict
would result.' 1
8
Doctrinally, however, Chief Justice Burger's in terrorem argument is
simply incorrect. The rights of those white jurors, asserted by the pros-
ecutor on their behalf, do not pose the same equal protection problem
as that in either Batson or McCollum because the Asian defendant cannot
strike all the white venire members and design for himself a fully Asian
jury. Whereas white defendants can exclude minority jurors to effect a
minority-free jury, minority jurors can generally only exclude whites to
effect a jury with some non-whites on it. This difference, rooted in
mathematical proportions and the parties' underlying motives, has con-
stitutional significance.
Justice Thomas also alluded to the question of whether black de-
113. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2356-57 (1992).
114. Under Georgia law, a defendant gets 20 peremptory challenges when indicted for
an offense carrying a penalty of four or more years. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-165 (1990).
115. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2351.
116. Batson, 476 U.S. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 128 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
118. Id.
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fendants could strike white jurors in his concurrence in McCollum." 9
The NAACP, as amicus curiae in McCollum, urged that "whether white
defendants can use peremptory challenges to purge minority jurors
presents quite different issues from whether a minority defendant can
strike majority group jurors."' 20 Justice Thomas opined that the differ-
ence was illusory, and that while the issue "technically remains open, in
his opinion, the result would be the same if black defendants struck
white jurors.121 For the reasons we have identified, we believe that issue
does remain open, and that nothing in the prior case law compels the
conclusion Justice Thomas's concurrence might suggest. The Court's
focus on jurors' rights needs. a careful definition of those rights, not a
wooden application of McCollum to jurors of every race, even in the
name of race-blind, even-handed application of the law.
B. Ideological Considerations
Not only does a doctrinal analysis lead to the conclusion that the
Batson line of cases should not extend to the challenge of white jurors,
but ideological concerns also compel that conclusion. The communitar-
ian principles that drove the Court's shift from the rights of the defend-
ant to the equal protection rights ofjurors call for a consideration of the
likely effects of the Court's decisions on public confidence and trust in
the judicial system generally.
Justice Blackmun noted that when white defendants on trial for
"white on black" crime strike every black juror, the public recognizes
not only that the jurors have suffered an injustice, but also that the court
has sanctioned it. As mentioned previously, black defendants strike
white jurors either to ensure that some black jurors sit on the jury or to
eliminate those suspected of racial bias who cannot be identified during
the cause portion of the voir dire.' 2 2 When a court permits challenges
for either of those reasons, the public is less likely to perceive the same
injustice.
First, the white jurors struck are not members of a group which has
been historically excluded from jury service either de jure or de facto. '
23
The exclusion of white jurors from the trial of a black defendant, there-
fore, does not recall the historical exclusion of one particular group
based on an earlier, pernicious system of discrimination. Second, be-
cause of their historical institutional dominance, white citizens' faith in
the judicial system is not as precarious as that of black citizens, at least
with respect to service on juries, on which whites have always partici-
pated.' 24 Whites excused from ajury venire are not as likely to suspect
that the trial will go forward with utter disregard for them as a class,
119. 112 S. Ct. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring).
120. 112 S. Ct. at 2360 n.2 (quoting Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 3-4).
121. 112 S. Ct. 2360 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring).
122. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
123. See Colbert, supra note 2, at 88-93.
124. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1611,
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since their exclusion from the jury will not likely result in an all non-
white jury.
Finally, minority defendants who are rendered unable to strike
white jurors whom they suspect to be racially prejudiced are the most
likely to lose faith in the system. The purpose of the peremptory chal-
lenge-to protect defendants against prejudice favoring the state and to
encourage public confidence in jury verdicts-will be undermined just
as ChiefJustice Burger warned in his dissent in Batson. Widespread dis-
trust of the legal system among large minority communities hardly en-
sures the kind of united, law-abiding society the Court purportedly
wants.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has shown a consistent resolve to confront the
peremptory challenge-equal protection conflict by endorsing a compro-
mise solution: preserve peremptory challenges, but cabin them within
the bounds of equal protection. Doctrinally, the Court has altered its
focus from defendant to jurors in articulating the equal protection rights
at stake. It has underscored those jurors'-as a proxy for all of soci-
ety's-trust and confidence in the judicial system.
125
In deciding how far to extend the rules it adopted in the Batson line
of cases, the Court should closely examine the doctrinal and ideological
considerations that have motivated it thus far. The Court's commitment
to preserving peremptory challenges, while advancing the communitar-
ian concerns underlying jury service, argues for a narrow definition of
those jurors' rights. While McCollum subjected the peremptory chal-
lenges of black jurors by white criminal defendants to review, it would
be inconsistent with the Court's concerns both for the peremptory chal-
lenge and for the public's faith in the system to apply this rule mechani-
cally to the reverse situation. Race-conscious peremptory challenges are
not the inherent stain on the system. What offends equal protection and
the public's regard for that system are vestiges of white exclusion of mi-
norities from meaningful participation in civic life. To the extent per-
emptory challenges serve other purposes, they should be scrupulously
protected.
1613 (1985). See also Hagan & Albonetti, Race, Class, and the Perception of Criminal Injustice in
America, 88 AM.J. Soc. 329 (1982).
125. This compromise has still not clarified how courts should weigh defendants' and
jurors rights in every circumstance, however. Compare Ramseur v. Beyer, No. 90-5333, slip
op. at 22-23 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1992) (holding a judge's singling out of black grand jurors
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause where no juror was actually excluded, and
where the judge did not countenance racial prejudice against jurors so much as seek to
create a racially-balanced jury) with id. at 56-57 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasizing the
equal protection rights of criminal defendants whose cases are presented to cross-section
grand juries as opposed to randomly selected grand juries).
336 [Vol. 70:2
